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Justice as fairness involves six fundamental ideas. They are laid out in a sequence in Justice as Fairness. A Restatement (Part I; see also PL: Lecture I). The first is the organizing idea, which the following five make more determinate by addressing important questions (JF, 24-5). The ideas are worked out on the basis of a reflection on aspects of the public political culture of a democratic society (JF, 5).
(1) The central, organizing idea is that of society as fair system of cooperation over time from one generation to the next. Social cooperation has at least three features: it is guided by publicly recognized rules and procedures, it includes terms of cooperation that are fair (they can reasonably be accepted by its participants and involve reciprocity or mutuality), and it tracks each participant’s rational advantage or good (JF, 6). The terms of social cooperation (the fundamental rights, liberties, opportunities, and allocation of benefits and burdens it involves) are specified by the principles of justice (JF, 7). (2) What would result when the first idea is fully realized? The result would be a well-ordered society, a society effectively regulated by the principles of justice (JF, 8-9). (3) What do the principles of justice apply to, exactly? They apply primarily to the basic structure of society, to “the way in which the main political and social institutions of society fit together into one system of social cooperation, and the way they assign basic rights and duties and regulate the division of advantages that arises from social cooperation over time” (JF, 10). The basic structure includes, for example, a society’s constitution, its economic structure, and the family in some form. (4) How are the fair terms of cooperation (the principles of justice) to be specified? In justice as fairness, they are presented as the focus of a hypothetical agreement, a social contract, between free and equal citizens reached under fair conditions. The original position is a device of representation through which such an agreement is envisaged. Its several features (such as the veil of ignorance) guarantee conditions that situate free and equal persons fairly and impose appropriate restrictions on the reasons used in assessing principles (JF, 14-8). (5) How are the citizens participating in social cooperation regarded? They are free and equal persons. They have to the requisite minimum degree the two moral powers that enable them to be full cooperators in a well-ordered society: a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the good (JF, 18-24). Finally, (6) how is a conception of justice, as a political conception, to be justified in a democratic society characterized by reasonable pluralism? It should be the subject of public justification (JF, 26-8). Through public justification, citizens justify to one another their political judgments on the basis of grounds they can all reasonably endorse as free and equal, regardless of their deeper, different, and often opposing moral, religious or philosophical comprehensive doctrines. The idea of public justification is further developed through the ideas of reflective equilibrium, overlapping consensus, and public reason.
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